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Sniper operations are high risk, high reward missions with unique traits and distinctive 
capabilities often resulting in great success or punishing failure. Within nearly all 
conceptions of sniper operations there is a perceived difference between civilian and 
military sniper engagements. This thesis presents an error-avoidance theory for guiding 
successful sniper operations across both domains. Inside sniper operations there are two 
critical errors that need to be avoided. These errors are defined as Type 1 and Type 2 
errors. Type 1 errors are those that result in the death of an innocent individual. Type 2 
errors occur when the targeted individual escapes the situation and the mission objective 
is not met, and thus the threat or potential threat remains active. Naturally, the goal is to 
avoid both errors. However, the rules of engagement established for any mission must, by 
necessity, privilege the avoidance of one error type over the other. The evaluation of 
three critical variables—operational environment, political and social context, and the 
stakes or risk in the situation—should prioritize which error to avoid. This thesis thereby 
establishes a theoretical framework that can be universally employed to establish rules of 
engagement by all those who use the sniper tactic, for both civilian and military 
operations. 
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Exploring the relationship between a man and his weapon has been a fascinating 
topic since the development of the rifle. The technique of precision fire from a concealed 
location to target a specific threat has played a significant role in both law enforcement 
and military engagements. We label this type of engagement as a sniper operation. Sniper 
operations have proven their effectiveness in history by resolving situations with precise 
and lethal efficiency while providing operator security with the proper use of space, 
cover, and concealment. Sniper operations have been employed for hundreds of years and 
have proven to be a valuable tool among combatants in all forms of conflicts. Sniper 
operations will continue to be used in future conflicts and are an important operation to 
be understood at all levels. 
Within the sniper community the term “long-gun” is a common moniker used to 
describe the sniper rifle or a sniper operation. Originating from the extended length of the 
rifle used for precision fire, this term throughout the thesis will reference a sniper rifle or 
operation. In recent Iraq conflicts, snipers have been able to interdict enemy forces in 
urban environments such as the city streets of Baghdad and Tikrit. In Afghanistan, on 
remote mountainsides, sniper observer positions have provided over-watch for units 
conducting engagement in villages below. Across these and countless other contexts, 
sniper operations have proven their worth time and time again. They have also secured 
their place in the history books by enduring the test of time. My aim is to explore and 
contribute to this topic through an error-avoidance theory of sniper command. 
My argument, at its roots, explains and also simplifies an integrated sniper theory 
and allows those tasked with executing, commanding, or supporting sniper operations to 
have a common framework from which to plan, support, and implement long-gun 
operations. The two types of organizations that are best known to utilize sniper 
techniques are military units and law enforcement agencies. The common perception that 
is held across these professions, and also in public opinion and the policy makers who 
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choose to employ such operations, is that these two groups’ approaches to sniper 
operations have very qualitative differences. Bartlett, for example, highlights variances in 
military and police sniper operations. He suggests that vast differences lie in the range of 
shots taken, target selection based between actions, uniform, or positive identification of 
target, the degree of precision required, collateral damage, and the training received 
(Bartlett, 1999). In reference to police sniper operations, Bartlett states: 
There are no allowances for missing. Simply wounding his target may not 
save the innocent lives which are at risk. Therefore, the police sniper has 
to shoot at an area which will physiologically produce the best chance of 
instantly incapacitating his target. That target—the cranial vault—is 
slightly larger than a tennis ball. Although his target is much closer than 
the military version, the police sniper has to shoot with pinpoint accuracy, 
with the intent of a first shot stop. And collateral damage is completely 
unacceptable. (Bartlett, 1999, p. 12) 
Although one could argue with some of his comments, Bartlett does highlight the 
common perceptions that are held within public opinion on the differences of military 
and police sniper operations. On the surface, Bartlett’s assessment of those differences 
listed in his book and other components such as rules of engagement, guidelines, decision 
processes, command structure, authority procedures and technical equipment may seem 
to be crucial differences. However, the sniper world revolves around more than those key 
components listed above; the goal of every sniper mission, I contend, revolves around 
error management. By rooting the conceptual ordering of sniper operations around error 
management, we can produce a simple, yet powerful tool for unifying our analysis of all 
such operations. 
In a sniper operation, the situation has already escalated to the point where those 
involved are considering life and death options for some of the players involved; the 
circumstances should rightly be considered a crisis. The ultimate objective of the sniper, 
resulting from specific fluctuating variables, is to rank order and potentially avoid Type 1 
and Type 2 errors. A Type 1 error is defined as a situation where an individual other than 
the intended or liable target is engaged with the sniper’s shot. In simpler terms, the Type 
1 error is when the individual killed by the sniper was not the intended or liable target. A 
Type 2 error is defined as scenario in which the targeted individual escapes the situation 
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and the objective is not met, and therefore the threat or potential threat remains active. In 
simpler terms, the targeted individual gets away unharmed. This Type 1 and Type 2 error 
assessment and evaluation model is based off Gartner’s arguments as expressed in “All 
Mistakes Are Not Equal: Intelligence Errors and National Security.” Such an approach 
helps look at complicated sniper cases under a simplified but powerful lens. Gartner uses 
this method to evaluate intelligence errors and I will here use this method to assess sniper 
cases. Gartner states: 
When the dangers of inaction are low and the cost of action high the 
intelligence community is more likely to make a Type II error. If the 
dangers of inaction are high and the costs of military action low it is more 
likely to commit a Type I error. Understanding the lens through which 
people view information can improve intelligence. (Gartner, 2013, p. 634) 
Using a similar understanding, as I have defined the Type 1 and 2 errors, I will explain 
that within a sniper situation, the primary route to success is to identify which error it is 
most important to avoid. An ordered prioritization of the error types allows the long-gun 
operators and command leadership to establish the most suitable rules of engagement to 
properly deal with these delicate conditions. This prioritization will vary depending on 
three main components; the operational environment, the social and political context, and 
the level of stakes, or risks in the situation. As these variables change in different sniper 
situations, the Type 1 and 2 Errors avoidance precedence will also. Thus the core of the 
proposed theory is avoidance of the errors, in preferential order. Of course, the primary 
object and the best-case scenario for any and all sniper operations is to avoid both errors. 
However, sniper operations are extremely complex and external factors are always 
affecting the outcome of the situation, making decisions difficult. Thus, this theory will 
assist in simplifying these circumstances and allow leaders and sniper operators to 
manage gains and losses by weighting Type 1 and Type 2 errors appropriately. 
As the individual sniper and operations have developed, so has the technology 
that is used and integrated into a sniper operation. Many authors have written on the 
tactics, techniques, and procedures of sniper operations but few have looked at the 
broader context of the actual event. The theory that I am proposing in this thesis is 
applicable to any unit because the type and model of long rifle the sniper uses, or the 
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brand of scope or range finder, and so on, is irrelevant within my theory. The 
technological developments cannot be immobilized—human curiosity will not allow it 
and there will continuously be new and relevant discoveries that can assist precision 
marksmanship. Thus, one advantage of this theory is that it places all organizations 
employing sniper operations within a single choice framework, since it addresses the 
bigger picture: the key elements and decisions required for a successful sniper mission. 
In his book Stalk and Kill: The Sniper Experience, Adrian Gilbert describes the 
process and development of sniping and also describes, through the eyes of real snipers 
throughout history, the factors that have changed and transformed (Gilbert, 1997). He 
states: 
The special pressures faced by a sniper—not least being the sight of the 
man he is about to kill—have imposed great physical and psychological 
strains, form which only the toughest survive. And if weapons and tactics 
have developed over the years, the human factor remains constant. The 
sniper is the ultimate hunter in a game where the quarry shoots back. This 
hunting instinct has changed little over the last two centuries, linking the 
sharpshooter of the American Revolutions to the professionally trained 
sniper of today. (Glibert, 1997, p. vii) 
Throughout this book, Gilbert presents events from different time periods and 
discusses not only the tactical elements but the lasting psychological and moral concerns 
that are common among those who embark on this journey (Gilbert, 1997). This book 
articulates excellent historical and personal accounts and explores the technological 
developments of snipers, but in order to make this research relevant we need to jump the 
gap and explore sniper operations in all environments and present a theory that is 
practical for both military and civilian units. The reason for this is clear. In present-day 
sniper conflicts, the once distinct lines have blurred from black and white to undeniably 
gray, and although the development of technology has assisted in accomplishing 
successful missions, this shift drives the need for a unified sniper theory across both 
domains. 
Conflicts in history in which sniper operations have been employed have 
transformed throughout time. In the context of war, it is evident that the way battles are 
started, fought, and finished has adjusted over time. World War II snipers approached 
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their missions very differently than snipers in the Iraq or Afghanistan Wars. Similarly, in 
the civilian sector, snipers are governed by either state or federal laws, which have their 
own flexibility and are subject to change. The types of situations that civilian snipers face 
each day oscillate where one day they are dealing with a distraught pregnant female 
holding a child hostage, to another day and different situation involving a barricaded 
standoff scenario. As stated above, this proposed theory will unify our thinking across 
these scenarios in regard to implementation; each sniper unit can employ it regardless of 
skill or capability. 
The usefulness of this theory is also amplified due to the fact that sniper conflicts 
in both military clashes and the civilian sectors have drawn closer together. The sniper 
situations, if anything, have become increasingly complicated, thus any factors that can 
simplify the process are needed and welcomed. A specific reason this theory is relevant 
and useful is because of the convergence between the military and civilian law 
enforcement activities in both public security enforcement and overseas war 
engagements. This crossover has tested the boundaries of both civilian law enforcement 
personnel and military members. In the civilian sector we are seeing an increasing 
number of paramilitary type units being utilized. Peter Kraska and Victor Kappeler 
describe their research that illustrates an increase of paramilitary type units in civilian law 
enforcement and their direct link to the military in “Militarizing American Police: The 
Rise and Normalization of Paramilitary Units.” Kraska and Kappeler state: 
Initially these units constituted a small portion of police efforts and were 
limited to large urban police departments. The constructed and publicly 
understood role of PPUs was confined to rare situations involving 
hostages, terrorism, or the “maniac sniper.” Despite the camouflage of 
these common assumptions, there have been recent unmistakable signs of 
intensifying military culture in police departments. Although these units 
are highly secretive about their operations, obvious expressions of 
militarism are found throughout contemporary policing in the form of 
changing uniforms, weaponry, language, training, and tactics. (Kraska & 
Kappeler, 1997, p. 3) 
Similarly, in the military environment, law enforcement type activities and solutions are 
progressing rapidly to solve conflicts, especially in counterinsurgencies and other 
irregular wars that are so dominant today. Kenneth H. Poole, Director of Joint Special 
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Operations University (JSOU) Strategic Studies Department describes John Alexander’s 
viewpoint in his article, Convergence: Special Operations Forces and civilian law 
enforcement. Poole writes: 
Alexander asserts that success in southwest Asia will hinge, in part, upon 
U.S. and host-nation military operations that effectively incorporate some 
police-type tasks (e.g., gathering and securing evidence) and law 
enforcement operations by police units that require military-like support. 
(Alexander, 2010, p. ix) 
Alexander believes as missions that the Special Operations force conducts converge with 
civilian law enforcement, additional training is required to advance effectiveness 
(Alexander, 2010). He is also a proponent the evaluation of civilian law enforcement 
applicability in special operations. Alexander is a retired military professional with 
combat experience in Special Operations and renowned author who recognizes this 
convergence. 
Joseph D. Celeski is a senior fellow in the Joint Special Operations University and 
distinguished Special Forces Officer with global experience. Celeski’s argument revolves 
around the importance of law enforcement activities in counterinsurgency. In his report 
entitled, Police and Law Enforcement in Counterinsurgency (COIN)–The Thick Blue 
Line, he states: 
Insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan routinely target police patrols, stations, 
and law enforcement leadership. One of the reasons for this targeted 
violence is insurgents clearly understand police and other internal security 
personnel act as the first responders in counterinsurgency environments 
and frequently provide the most immediate check on insurgent activities. 
(Celeski, 2009, p. 1) 
Celeski is another expert with practical hands-on experience that communicates the idea 
that effective policing can lead to successful counterinsurgency campaigns. Hence, with 
sniper operations producing effective results it would be beneficial to provide a common 
framework that both civilian and military commanders could work from. Celeski 
concludes his report with the keynote idea that effective policing can combat 
counterinsurgency. Some of his explanations include that the police and law enforcement 
personnel have existing legitimacy in the society thus supporting stability in the regions. 
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He also states that law enforcement entities commonly are the first responders to the 
damage inflicted by the counterinsurgency violence, and with appropriate responses the 
policing can displace the violence before it lays roots (Celeski, 2009). 
Sniper operations are critical crisis situations that have significant impact at all 
levels, both civilian and military is the sniper operation. Sniper missions, if conducted 
correctly, can arguably be some of the most effective and important operations of any 
unit that carry its capability. Sniper operations require specific training unique to the 
normal police and military exercise. Therefore, due to the nature of this type of operation 
it has the potential to be productive or extremely counterproductive and cause severe 
issues on multiple levels. As support, one will not find a substantial amount of writing on 
snipers operation that has been successful but, to the contrary, there are countless articles 
on operations that have been tagged as failed missions. For example, some of the more 
prevalent and well known accounts have been the situations at Ruby Ridge, Waco, Iraq 
and Afghanistan where there has been speculation of misuse of the sniper. Loss of life, 
valuable time, and critical assets in forms of monetary and manpower have been 
expended due to these situations. An error-avoidance theory that bases its evaluation on 
the nature of the environment, the social political repercussions and factors, as well the 
stakes that hang in the balance will help delineate between, and give relative weight to, 
the Type 1 and Type 2 errors that are the ultimate considerations for sniper success. 
B. ERROR AVOIDANCE MODEL 
The model of Error Avoidance in Figure 1 shows the arguments I have developed 
above, and constitutes a unified theory of sniper operations. As variables are explored 
and costs of the errors are prioritized, the level of success in any sniper situation can 
potentially be enhanced. The Error-avoidance theory allows for any sniper element, at a 
baseline tactical ability, to implement a sound strategy, whether military or civilian, and 
enhance positive outcomes. The main considerations revolve around avoidance of errors 
identified previously as Type 1 and 2. 
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Figure 1.  Pictorial Representation of the Model of Error Avoidance 
The assessment of variables determines the type of error that is more costly in any 
specific scenario and that can assist the success level (see Figure 1). Certainly, as in any 
sniper situation, the variables shift and may not be clearly identifiable. Therefore, the 
theory presents a heuristic continuum that varies from total success to ultimate failure. 
The types of sniper operations depicted in the continuum also vary. The sniper attrition 
strategy in World War II would avoid different errors than a civilian hostage standoff 
would. The goal is to provide the best calculation that suggests which errors to avoid. 
These variables at times, have different weighted values depending on the situation that 
can cause a slide toward avoidance of one error or the other. This will be depicted in the 
following figures by the length of the dotted arrow that is associated with each of the 
respected variables. The longer the arrow, as shown in the figures, represents the stronger 
a relationship between that variable and avoidance of a particular error. In certain cases, 
the variables can have opposing affects that can affect the final preference of avoidance 
in large or small ways. Therefore, the variables in the same case may weight heavy 
toward a Type 1 avoidance and a Type 2 avoidance, which can shift the final preferences. 
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In the following chapters, examples of these types of situations will be outlined and 
thoroughly explained. The final preference of avoidance in the figures is depicted by the 
star, this will portray the effects of the combined variables and show which type error is 
suggested to avoid based off the Error-avoidance theory. These variables explore deep 
into the perceptions of the environment and personalities involved; they discover more 
than just the tactical evaluation and predictive analysis of the situation. These variables 
are as listed: 
1. Operational Environment: The environment is the first indicator in 
which the sniper units gains principal insights into which error is central to 
avoid. The environment is critical to a complete understanding of the 
proper execution of a sniper shot. As suggested and shown in the 
illustration, sniper operations find their use across the full spectrum. For 
instance, the environments vary greatly, from “shoot on site” attrition 
scenarios as in a World War environment to an extremely selective shot 
that would only be made under certain criteria such as in a hostage 
scenario. 
2. Social / Political Context: The social / political effect from a sniper 
operation also plays in as a significant variable. This type of effect drives 
deep into the lingering effects of a sniper shot. Every sniper operation has 
a social and political reverberation, the point being that these results can 
and will affect the operation, where it is in a positive or negative context. 
The social / political effect can place a large amount of pressure on the 
conduct of the operation. For example, a hypothetical situation in which 
an infant is held hostage by a distressed family member would create 
substantial disturbance within social and political realms if the infant was 
injured by the snipers bullet, thus, potentially placing an abnormal amount 
of political and social pressure on the sniper plan, action, and aftermath of 
the difficult situation. 
3. Stakes of the Target: The stakes of the target has a distinct impact on the 
operation as a whole. The importance or popularity of the targeted 
individual can drive the nature of the operation. This variable plays into 
the perceptions of individuals that are looking or observing the operations 
from the outside inwards. An explanation that describes how this variable 
creates different paths would be the targeting of a Taliban leader in a 
remote village in Afghanistan, as opposed to targeting a well-known 
political figurehead who is mentally distraught over a failed election. 
These hypothetical situations described would affect the conduct of the 
operation. In simple terms, the effects of a political leader’s death would 
produce a different outcome than that of a Taliban leader. 
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As shown in the Figure 2, the error-avoidance theory process follows a sequential 
process that can help develop and assisted with complicated decisions that always 
accompany these complex operations. The error-avoidance theory will aid leaders in 
developing, planning, and executing sniper operations. The ultimate goal of the error-
avoidance theory is successful sniper operations. This theory will assist in development, 
planning and execution of a long-gun operation. Issuing the proper rules of engagement is 
one of the most central and critical areas in successful sniper operations and this theory 
will provide the baseline for fitting that need in an accurate and timely manner. As shown 
in Figure 2, it follows three main steps; evaluate the variables, identify avoidance 
preferences, and develop and execute the sniper operation. 
 
Figure 2.  Error-Avoidance Theory Process 
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In the following chapters, to evaluate the error-avoidance theory, sniper cases will 
be explored using a systematic approach. Each case will be evaluated by using the 
theory’s variables which will uncover and suggest potential flaws that could have been 
avoided. To understand and be able to evaluate each case a standard format will be 
followed. Initially, a summary of the case will be presented then the three variables will 
be explored in detail and finally, the conclusion will look at the Type 1 and 2 errors and 
their effects on the outcome. The range of cases, with differing variables, from both 
military and civilian situations shows the consistency and value of the error-avoidance 
theory. This format will be followed for each case to maintain consistency. 
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II. CASE STUDY: RUBY RIDGE 
In order to evaluate an error-avoidance theory it is reasonable to look into past 
cases in which sniper operations set the stage for dramatic results, both positive and 
negative. On 19 October 1995, in an opening statement before the United States Senate, 
Louis J Freeh, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) stated: 
At Ruby Ridge, the FBI did not perform at the level which the American 
people expect or deserve from the FBI. Indeed, for the FBI, Ruby Ridge 
was a series of terribly flawed law enforcement operations with tragic 
consequences. (United States Congress, Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Government 
Information, 1995, p. 1) 
The tragic consequences that Director Freeh refers to in these remarks are the deaths of a 
Deputy United States Marshal, a wife and a young boy. The wife, Mrs. Weaver, was 
killed by a sniper’s bullet but that gunshot was not intended or even aimed at her. This 
was a tragic incident in which sniper operations played a role that was very public and 
deadly. A structured evaluation of this incident will show the benefit of the proposed 
sniper theory.  
The actions at Ruby Ridge in August 1992 were the result of a series of escalating 
events that instigated the standoff between the Weaver family and law enforcement 
officials. It began in January of 1985, when the United States Secret Service began an 
investigation of Randy Weaver due to allegations of threats against the President and 
other governmental and law enforcement officials. Randy Weaver’s associations with the 
Aryan Nation group also placed him on the government watch lists. Weaver eventually 
crossed paths with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF). Weaver met a 
BATF informant at a World Aryan Congress and established a relationship with him. 
This informant eventually met up with Weaver at his house and purchased two illegal 
sawed off shotguns from him. The BATF approached Weaver with the hopes of turning 
him into an informant but Weaver refused and as a result the BATF issued a warrant for 
his arrest. The warrant was initiated because of Weaver’s possession of unregistered 
firearms. As a precaution, the BATF arrested Weaver in January of 1991 while 
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pretending to be motorists in distress as opposed to attempting an arrest at his mountain 
top residence. Agents were fearful of instigating an unneeded conflict and they wanted to 
avoid the harm of Weaver’s children and any other innocent civilians. A trial was 
scheduled for 19 February 1991, which Weaver failed to appear and an additional warrant 
for arrest for Weaver was issued. At this point, the United States Marshal Service got 
involved and between March of 1991 and August of 1992 they attempted to peacefully 
convince Weaver to surrender voluntarily. However, this produced no results; thus teams 
from the Special Operation Group of the United States Marshal Service began conducting 
reconnaissance of the residence in another attempt to develop a plan to take Weaver 
peacefully without harm to law enforcement officers or the Weaver family. On 21 August 
1992, during a surveillance operation, a team of six Marshals looking for alternate places 
away from the cabin to arrest Weaver were discovered by one of the Weaver dogs. Randy 
Weaver, Sammy, his teenage son, Kevin Harris, an associate and Weaver’s daughters 
followed the dog to investigate. The Marshals retreated back up the road and eventually 
identified themselves but Weaver turned around and ran back to the cabin. Following 
Randy Weaver’s escape back to the cabin an exchange of gunfire erupted which resulted 
in the deaths of Deputy Marshal William Degan, Sammy Weaver and the dog (United 
States Department of Justice, 1994). 
When the U.S. Marshals Service learned of the death of Marshal Degan they 
asked for and received FBI assistance in the form of first the FBI Special Weapons and 
Tactics (SWAT) team and later it’s Hostage Rescue Team (HRT). These HRT teams 
consisted of snipers/observers. While traveling to the site the HRT advance team received 
information and drafted special Rules of Engagement (listed below) to address the danger 
they expected to encounter. According to the plan, a surrender demand would be 
delivered. In order to prevent an ambush by the Weavers or sympathizers in the area, 
teams of sniper/observer were stationed overlooking the cabin before the delivery of the 
surrender demand. The surrender demand was given on 22 August 1992 using Armored 
Personnel Carriers (APC) to deliver a telephone to the cabin. Prior to the APC departure, 
the sniper teams also moved into position to overwatch the delivery but before they left 
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the following Rules of Engagement (ROE) were briefed (United States Department of 
Justice, 1994). Drafted Rules of Engagement: 
1. If any adult male is observed with a weapon prior to the 
announcement, deadly force can and should be employed, if the 
shot can be taken without endangering any children. 
2. If any adult in the compound is observed with a weapon after the 
surrender announcement is made, and is not attempting to 
surrender, deadly force can and should be employed to neutralize 
the individual. 
3. If compromised by any animal, particularly the dogs, that animal 
should be eliminated. 
4. Any subjects other than Randall Weaver, Vicki Weaver, Kevin 
Harris, presenting threats of death or grievous bodily harm, the FBI 
rules of deadly force are in effect. Deadly force can be utilized to 
prevent the death or grievous bodily injury to oneself or that of 
another. (United States, Department of Justice, 1994, p. 17) 
On 22 August 1992, Lou Horiuchi a FBI sniper, fired two shots. Horiuchi 
believed his first shot was directed toward Kevin Harris, who was armed and appeared to 
be making movement to shoot at a helicopter which was running observation missions. 
Horiuchi had actually aimed this shot at Randy Weaver; Weaver’s awkward movement 
led Horiuchi to believe that he had missed his target. Approximately twenty seconds later 
Horiuchi identified what he thought was the target of his first shot running back to enter 
into the cabin, he fired a second shot, leading the target because of his quick movement. 
The second bullet killed Vicki Weaver, Weaver’s wife, who was standing behind the 
door to the cabin.It also wounded Kevin Harris. Horiuchi later testified that he did not see 
or know that Vicki Weaver was standing in the doorway and that he was not targeting 
her. Combined, the two shots wounded Kevin Harris and Randy Weaver and killed Vicki 
Weaver. It took another 8 days to convince Harris and Weaver to surrender, but finally, 
on 30 August, Harris did so. On the next day, Weaver surrendered, ending the Ruby 
Ridge standoff but not the controversy (United States Department of Justice, 1994). 
A. ENVIRONMENT 
The environment in which this case developed and eventually came to a close was 
constantly changing and as a result caused issues that ultimately lead to a Type 1 error 
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where FBI sniper Lou Horiuchi mistakenly shot and killed Vicki Weaver. Several points 
involving the changing environment made it difficult for the leaders to appropriately 
address the situation.  
The first environmental point I will address is related to the physical geography. 
Once the federal law enforcement contained the area, the situation posed no real threat to 
those outside of the participants on and surrounding the Ruby Ridge location. The 
situation was ultimately contained to the small tract of land in Northern Idaho directly 
endangering those involved or living within the Weaver residence. The environment 
within the Weaver house also complicated the situation. Lane Crothers, in his book Rage 
on the Right, describes the development of the Weaver’s family religious environment. 
Several key transition points intensify the Weaver’s beliefs and actions. The first of these 
points was suggested to be after Vicki’s reading of The Late Great Planet Earth by Hal 
Lindsey and the Weaver’s adoption of its teachings. This book presented an apocalyptic 
religious struggle between good and evil forces, in which the “good guys” were Christian 
literalists who took the bible literally, implementing and following its every word in their 
daily life and the “bad guys” as foreigners, people who were of color, communist, and 
basically anybody of different beliefs. The Weavers lived a Legalist lifestyle, in which 
Randy began pressing his religious extremist viewpoints at work which led to extreme 
tension between co-workers and supervisors. Randy Weaver became increasingly 
isolationistic due to his religious fundamentalism. The second transition took place when 
Randy, in 1983, moved to Montana and then to Idaho to escape and distance his family 
from neighbors and conflict. In 1986, Randy attended the Aryan Nations World 
Conference where the teaching states that whites are the superior race and that movement 
and political avenues that supported right of minorities were seen as personal attacks on 
the Aryan followers (Crothers, 2003). This type of home and lifestyle environment 
created an atmosphere where the federal law enforcement agents became the ultimate evil 
in the Weavers eyes and when backed into a corner easily had the personal will to fight 
and no difficulties with a prolonged clash. Crothers describes these different 
environments inside the Weaver household and that of the federal officials after the initial 
firefight when Sammy and U.S. Marshal Degan are killed, 
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From the perspective of the commanders in Washington, D.C., however, 
the events that occurred on August 21 proved Randy Weaver’s 
irreconcilable hatred of the federal government. From the perspective of 
those inside the Weaver’s home, the events, including Sammy’s death, 
proved the federal government’s irresponsible evil. Much of the tragedy 
that followed was grounded in these fixed, rigid worldviews. (Crothers, 
2003, p. 83) 
On the opposite side, for the law enforcement agencies, the environment was also 
complicated by the fact that local, state, and three different federal law enforcement 
agencies played a role in the issue. As the leadership role transitioned from ATF to U.S. 
Marshall’s Service to the FBI, conflict and confusion rose as well as a need for a quick 
solution. This quick solution, in my opinion, shaped the rules of engagement that were in 
effect when Lou Horiuchi shot and killed the incorrect target.  
In the article, “What Happened on Ruby Ridge: Terrorism or Tyranny?” Betty 
Bobratz, Stephanie Shanks-Meile, and Danelle Hallenbeck state, “Randy and Vicki 
Weaver, white Christian separatists, were singled out for government scrutiny because of 
their Christian Identity religious views and their attendance at the annual Congresses of 
Aryan Nations” (Dobratz, Shanks-Meile, & Hallenbeck, 2003). A clear understanding of 
the differing environments within this situation could have pushed the officials toward 
avoiding making the critical Type 1 error, which sparked national attention, primarily of 
a negative connotation, on the law enforcement officials involved. 
B. SOCIAL / POLITICAL BLOWBACK 
Insight into the social and political effects in the Ruby Ridge Case presented 
themselves physically and vocally at the bottom of the Ruby Ridge Hill. Law 
enforcement officials had to maintain a roadblock out of fear of any assistance to the 
Weaver family or disruption of the operation (Crothers, 2003). Crothers referring to the 
blockade at the bottom of the hill states, 
This barrier became a rallying point for skinheads, white supremacists, 
antigovernment libertarians, and anyone else in the area with an ax to 
grind against the authorities. They began a ten-day vigil in which Weaver 
supporters threatened agents, accused authorities of being “baby killers,” 
and vented their rage against what they saw as inappropriate intrusion of 
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the federal government in the life of a small mountain community and one 
of its families…The barricade also became ground zero for a large 
contingent of television, newspaper, and magazine reporters who, in the 
absence of any news from the mountain itself, interviewed protesters and 
took pictures of the growing contingent of federal agents, helicopters, and 
armored vehicles that were descending on Ruby Ridge. Weaver’s 
message, thus, was carried to the nation even as he remained quiet on top 
of his hill. (Crothers, 2003, p. 85) 
The amount of interest and chaos that was stirred because of this incident was 
extraordinary. In the aftermath of this operation the social and political effects from one 
sniper shot outraged many people and negatively impacted the FBI and its reputation. 
Crothers suggests, “Ultimately, in many ways Horiuchi became the public face of the 
FBI’s oppressive evil for right-wing ideologues in the United States” (Crothers, 2003). 
Politically, Horiuchi’s shot became a nightmare scenario for the FBI and ultimately a 
negative perception for all federal law enforcement agencies. Any mention of the Ruby 
Ridge case in today’s society is always reflected as negative. Thomas Lujan, author of the 
article presented in Parameters, “Legal Aspects of Domestic Employment of the Army,” 
discussed the negative aftermath of the standoff at Ruby Ridge. Lujan states, 
The FBI actions were subsequently investigated exhaustively by the 
Department of Justice and by Congress. Five senior members of the FBI 
were suspended and finally disciplined, and the government settled a 
wrongful death suit brought by Vicki Weaver’s survivors for over $3 
million. Randy Weaver was acquitted in a criminal trial of the original 
firearms charges and absolved of criminal liability for the death of the 
federal marshal. (Lujan, 1997, p. 90) 
A significant portion of the post incident investigations largely evolved around the 
unusual ROE that was used but never officially approved by the FBI Headquarters. As 
identified above by ROE numbers 1 and 2, the agents were authorized to engage armed 
targets in an offensive manor, which was a departure from the standard use of using 
deadly force, which was used only in self-defense or in defense of others who were 
themselves placed in pending danger that would cause death or serious harm (Lujan, 
1997). Was this an over aggressive approach or a justifiable assessment of the situation in 
which was considered explicitly hazardous? I would suggest that the ROE in sniper 
operations, both military and civilian, are extremely important; but, the real breakdown in 
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the system had to do with improper assessment of the prosed variables resulting in tragic 
consequences caused by not avoiding the Type 1 error. The social and political effects of 
killing an untargeted individual outweighed the risks that were currently presented on 
ground. 
C. STAKES 
What is the realistic impact of killing Randy Weaver or Kevin Harris? That is the 
true question when assessing the variable, “stakes.” Were the actions of the law 
enforcement officials equalized by Randy or Kevin’s genuine threat? These are tough 
questions that may never be answered fully, but evaluating the impact of the deaths of 
these targets may help in prioritizing errors to avoid. In this case, as suggested above, 
with physical environment controlled by the law enforcement officials, and the political 
and social blowback obviously increased by the media and groupies hanging around at 
the bottom of the hill, the impact of a stray shot could be easily recognizable as an 
apparent catastrophe. 
As shown in Figure 3, based on a critical evaluation of the theory’s variables, the 
emphasis of avoidance would be placed on the Type 1 error, avoiding a sniper shot that 
would kill an unintended target. In my assessment, the point at which Horiuchi took his 
second shot placed an excessive risk on breaking the Type 1 error, which it did resulting 
in the death of Vicki Weaver. Although legally the shot was deemed reasonable within 
the eyes of the FBI director, it should and could have been avoided with potentially a 
cleaner outcome (United States Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Government Information, 1995). 
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Figure 3.  Ruby Ridge 
In conclusion, Figure 3 demonstrates that each of the factors in the Ruby Ridge 
case show that avoidance of a Type 1 error is prioritized over a Type 2 error. The 
strongest factor in the Ruby Ridge case is the outcome of the social and political 
blowback. In this scenario, the federal, state, and local law enforcement agents involved 
dealt with substantial repercussions, due to the negative blowback that originated from 
the sniper shot that killed Vicki Weaver. These undesirable effects have lingered on even 
years after the incident. In addition, a stronger assessment of these three variables would 
have potentially also shown the need for an adjustment in the rules of engagement that 
the law enforcement officers were operating under. An increased emphasis on avoiding a 
Type 1 error, as suggested by the error-avoidance theory, would have supported an 
improved ending. 
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III. CASE STUDY: HUNTING HUMANS: RAMPAGE IN  
SAN YSIDRO 
One of the worst single gunman massacres in the United States occurred on 18 
July 1984, when police in San Ysidro, outside San Diego, California, responded to a 
shooting incident that involved Special Weapons and Tactics snipers. James Huberty 
entered a McDonald’s restaurant around 4 p.m. that day and proceeded to shoot everyone 
in sight. Huberty carried multiple weapons including an Uzi carbine, a Browning high 
powered rifle, and a Winchester model 1200 shotgun. During the 77-minute crisis, 
Huberty strolled around the McDonald’s restaurant creating chaos: killing and injuring 
everyone he could at a staggering pace. The age range of those murdered and wounded 
was sickening, spanning from 8 months to 74 years. Huberty also fired at children riding 
bikes in the surrounding area outside the McDonald’s, and at a nearby fire truck. In the 
end, Huberty shot 251 times, killing 21 people and wounding 19 others (Dickinson, 
2013). 
Mike Granberry,  in a The Los Angeles Times article about Huberty’s wife, states, 
“In what now is a well-publicized comment, Huberty told his wife that he was leaving to 
go ‘human-hunting’—and ended up at a McDonald’s” (Granberry, 1984). Michael 
Rosario, of the San Diego Primary Response Team (PRT), was among one of the first 
officers to arrive at the chaotic site. Huberty did not waste any time; he immediately fired 
at Rosario and other members of his PRT, which consisted of six law enforcement 
officers. The PRT team moved fast and, according to Dickinson, stated that the primary 
response team moved rapidly towards the building. Within the first 20 minutes, starting 
from the time the initial call to police dispatchers was received, a command post had been 
put in place, and a full cordon of the entire area had been established. Additionally, a 
recall of all members of the San Diego Police Department was sent out to assist the 
frenzied situation and they were able to relieve the patrol officers that had established the 
inner perimeter by 4:45 p.m. Some victims had been able to escape the restaurant by a 
back door. They were able to give information to the police officers, including the fact 
that the shooter had more than one weapon and that there were others still inside the 
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building who needed medical care. Snipers from the SWAT team were able to set up and 
get into position at 5:04 p.m; an on-site supervisor gave the “green light’’—permission to 
fire at Huberty . However, due to poor visibility from the sunlight glare, tinted and 
gunshot cracked windows, a clean shot did not present itself, and Huberty continued his 
shootout including firing at a SWAT officer (Dickinson, 2013). 
At this time, the SWAT commander had not arrived at the scene yet and he 
withdrew the “green light” order until 5:13 p.m. when he arrived at the site. Sniper teams 
reported they had not had an opportunity for a clear shot during that time, so it was 
reported that they did not miss an opportunity to stop Huberty’s rampage and that the 
change in orders had no ill effect. SWAT sniper Chuck Foster was positioned on a nearby 
rooftop. Finally, at 5:17 p.m., he was able to identify Huberty and fired. Huberty was 
struck and killed by Foster’s bullet. With Huberty down, the SWAT team cleared the area 
to ensure there were not any additional threats, then the medical personnel entered the 
McDonald’s and began to take control of the horrible situation. Triage and treatment was 
initiated for the wounded and the 21 dead victims were removed.  
Interestingly, the McDonald’s Corporation was sued by some of Huberty’s 
victim’s family members. On 9 July, 1987, it was stated from the Court of Appeals of 
California, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, that the victim’s family based their 
argument as such: 
Their case was built from the assumption that McDonald’s Plaintiffs sued 
for damages for wrongful death and personal injuries on theories of 
negligence and premises liability, alleging McDonald’s failed to provide 
adequate safety devices or security personnel to protect customers from 
dangerous and known risks. In support of their theory of liability, 
plaintiffs allege McDonald’s knew its San Ysidro facility was in a high-
crime area and its employees were so concerned over the criminal activity 
within the immediate vicinity they had solicited a private security 
company to offer its services to McDonald’s. The security service’s 
proposal to McDonald’s management and ownership cited the area’s high-
crime rate, increasing gang activity and nearby incidents of violent crimes 
which would have endangered McDonald’s patrons had they occurred on 
its premises. Claiming economic reasons, McDonald’s declined the 
security service offer to provide a uniformed security officer at $5.75 an 
hour. (Lopez v. McDonald’s Corp., 193 CA3d 495, 1987) 
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This case was overturned. McDonald’s was found not liable because it had no 
responsibility or duty to provide defense against this unforeseeable assault against its 
employees and patrons (Lopez v. McDonald’s Corp., 1987). In addition, and particularly 
prescient for this thesis, a lawsuit was also filed against the San Diego Police Department 
by the victims’ surviving family members, contending that the law enforcement officers 
did not stop Huberty quickly enough, thus not adequately protecting the innocent 
civilians within the McDonald’s. The finding of the Fourth District Court of Appeals was 
that there was not a distinctive relationship between the police and victims and that the 
police could not be liable for failing to protect the victims (Dickinson, 2013). 
Even though the suit was dismissed by the court, this case led to much discussion 
and in some cases revision of the role of SWAT and Snipers in this type of tragic 
situation. Many agencies depended on SWAT or other similar teams with sniper 
capabilities to respond to active shooters, even when this resulted in delay. Unfortunately, 
in most cases SWAT teams are not the first on the scene. Several lessons in the article 
that were addressed by Dickinson, a Lieutenant in an Iowa police department, were 
drawn from this incident. Some of those lessons relate closely to the error-avoidance 
theory of sniper command being explored in this thesis. Those are, as described by 
Dickinson: 
 Patrol Officers must act decisively when people are being killed, time 
delay in waiting for SWAT/Sniper must be considered, 
 Expect first information to be conflicting and confusing, one gunman with 
multiple weapons may be perceived as multiple shooters, 
 On-site persons must be allowed to make critical decisions after improved 
training, 
 Be prepared to act to save lives, 
 This type of incident can happen anywhere, large city or small 
community. (Dickinson, 2013, p. 2–3) 
As this case explores a mad gunman’s rampage with intentions to kill as many 
people as possible, it highlights the error-avoidance theory’s relevance in which 
command leadership could have directed specific instructions, whether preset or not, to 
resolve situations of this nature as quickly as possible. 
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A. ENVIRONMENT 
An outside assessment of this incident would most likely suggest that within this 
case the time between Huberty opening fire on the individuals inside the McDonald’s and 
him being neutralized by the police sniper was stretched out needlessly. Every moment 
that went by with Huberty’s threat unblocked, more innocent civilians were at risk of 
being killed, which suggests that this case committed a Type 2 error. Even though 
Huberty was eventually killed by sniper fire, a plausible argument, which was submitted 
in the courts, proposed that Huberty was left to continue his rampage for too long. As 
opposed to the Ruby Ridge incident, law enforcement officers on the scene could clearly 
see the carnage that was in progress. Huberty had shot and killed innocent people both 
inside and outside the fast food restaurant. The atmosphere in this situation, as chaotic as 
it was, provided law enforcement officials at a minimum, insight into the violence that 
was occurring before their eyes. This environment, a public McDonald’s, presented 
extremely difficult decisions for law enforcement officers, specifically the SWAT sniper 
teams. With only one real target among the many frantic civilians, whose actions were 
based on survival, the job of resolving the situation became an extremely difficult task. 
However, the first possible opportunity to neutralize the target in these situations should 
be capitalized on with deadly force. With a hasty assessment of the environment and on-
going active shooter situation, a Type 2 error, or even an extended amount of time the 
target is allowed to engage and kill civilians, can produce the worst result possible: 
innocent deaths that could have been prevented. It was stated in the San Diego Union-
Tribune that Huberty had an additional 100 rounds of unexpended ammunition that with 
his mindset could and would have been an additional 100 casualties (“21 die in San 
Ysidro Massacre,” 1984). 
Nevertheless, it can be easily seen that the environment in this circumstance also 
drives the snipers to avoid a Type 1 error, not shooting an innocent civilian. The 
environment was populated with innocent civilians who unfortunately stepped into a bad 
situation that afternoon by choosing that McDonald’s eatery. The desperate nature of the 
individuals both inside and outside the restaurant combined with obstructed vision due to 
fragmented glass and vehicular movement most likely made it difficult to gain a clear 
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picture into what was happening inside. Therefore, a concern that was relevant at the time 
would have been shooting an innocent person, therefore adding to the death toll. These 
environmental factors would shift the snipers toward avoiding this Type 1 error. 
However, as in many sniper cases, a variable will often shift toward avoidance of a Type 
1 error and another variable will push toward a Type 2 error. The error-avoidance theory 
forces an ordered preference in order to base the rules of engagement from. This 
produces clarity to the sniper teams having to take a shot. This allows and supports clear 
and accurate decisions when time is a critical factor. Nonetheless, in my assessment 
within this case the imminence, on-going active threat that had to be immediately stopped 
drove the preference for avoiding a Type 2 error. 
B. SOCIAL / POLITICAL BLOWBACK 
The social and political effects that lingered on after this bloody rampage lasted 
years, similar tothose of the Ruby Ridge incident. The aftermath of the tragedy included 
nationwide media coverage and the situation is known as one of the worst massacres in 
United States history, with 21 slain and 19 injured. With the actions of the law 
enforcement officers and decisions of the McDonald’s franchise under severe scrutiny, 
the media painted a negative picture of them both, implying that both were partially 
responsible for the deaths of the individuals in and around the San Ysidro McDonald’s 
that day. The San Diego Union-Tribune online article recounting the event stated, “Media 
were setting up in Los Angeles for coverage of the summer Olympic games and 200 
reporters flooded into San Ysidro to record the carnage. At the time, it was the largest 
one-day toll taken by a single killer in American history” (“21 die in San Ysidro 
Massacre,” 1984). This increased number of reporters facilitated the rapid dispersal of the 
innocent with graphic pictures and accounts of the shooting in multiple forms of public 
media. The social and political blowback of this case was significant and played a large 
role in making a correct error avoidance preference choice. Although potentially 
unforeseen at the time because of the randomness of the case, it most definitely needs to 
be taken seriously and applied in future sniper operations. This attention will be able to 
assist topics such as operational planning, developing rules of engagement, and 
delegation of responsibility. In the way this case developed, it seemed as if the social and 
 26
political blowback variable pushed the preference toward avoiding a Type 1 error with 
the amount of time that was taken before the target was shot and killed. However, 
looking at this type of sniper case the theory would suggest that there would be 
significant effects from the social and political variable when focusing on avoidance of 
either Type 1 or Type 2 errors, but, as the death toll was quickly increasing it makes 
natural sense to minimize the loose of life and therefore should push the social and 
political blowback variable toward a Type 2 error. 
C. STAKES 
The impact of Chuck Foster’s sniper shot that killed Huberty was the opposite of 
what many engagements like that produce. In many cases, the aftermath of a sniper 
taking an individual’s life is questioned and evaluated with a fine tooth comb, looking at 
every detail, scrutinized at every turn. However, in this account, the question was not 
why did officials take this man’s life, but, why did they not neutralize him before the 
death of 21 people? These kinds of occurrences are rare but should be examined because 
they can help us understand cases where the avoidance of Type 2 errors should be given 
preference, since Type 2 errors in these cases have the potential to be the most violent 
and life-costing events. Within this situation, the stakes of a shot not taken when 
presented can result in lives lost and the importance of stopping the assailant at some 
levels outweighs risks that might have to be taken—such as the risk of a Type 1 error. 
Speed in these circumstances often plays as the largest and most important determinant of 
success or failure. In the end, the stakes of killing Huberty himself were minimal because 
he physically showed all involved that his intentions were to inflict as much destruction 
as possible. That is, he was undeniably liable to be killed in order to block the on-going 
threat he was posing. The realization of this and evaluation of the variables would push 
future snipers and commanders to place emphasis on avoiding a Type 2 error in such 
cases. 
Unfortunately, tragedies like this are unpredictable: when disturbed people kill 
numerous human beings in an unexplainable storm it is difficult to understand why. 
Realistically, the reasons behind these malicious acts will probably never be revealed but 
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this proposed theory can potentially support snipers and their units in assessing the 
situation and making quick and astute decisions. In the past, we have seen repeat 
situations similar to this at Columbine, CO, and more recently, Newtown, CT, where 
mass murders have occurred. The error-avoidance theory presented here will assist in 
identifying these types of events that have parallel variables and push snipers and their 
chain of commands to avoiding the catastrophic Type 2 error. Represented in Figure 4, 
preference placed on evading a Type 2 error where the target escapes or even is allowed 
to extend the time of freedom he or she has, as occurred in this case, is vital to mission 
accomplishment. 
 
Figure 4.  San Ysidro Massacre 
The shooting at San Ysidro depicts a complicated sniper engagement because as 
the variables present themselves they show that they can present reasons for avoiding 
both type errors. Figure 4 demonstrates that both the environmental, social, and political 
blowback variables pose arguments for avoiding both Type 1 and Type 2 errors. The 
weight of the variables favor eluding a Type 2 error with also slight indications toward 
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the opposite error, but not enough to change the final conclusion.   The stakes variable 
strongly favors avoiding a Type 2 error, as in this case, subsequently resulting in loss of 
human life. Thus, use of the error-avoidance theory produces clear direction when 
developing, planning, and executing long-gun operations that strongly resemble this 
situation. Regrettably, cases that mirror the San Ysidro massacre will occur again and the 
error-avoidance theory has shown that preference for avoiding a Type 2 error will yield 
the better outcome. 
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IV. CASE STUDY: KLE SNIPER ENGAGEMENT 
The error-avoidance theory seeks to provide best-case solutions for command 
decisions in every sniper situation. As discussed in the argument, the theory disregards 
the skill of the unit or agency operating. This is a feature, not a shortcoming of the theory, 
for it allows broad application across theaters, levels of command, and types of sniper 
operations. Within some sniper missions the potential controversy level is very low and 
with others, as in the Ruby Ridge case, it can be extremely high. A correct theory for 
sniper operations needs to account for these differences when it makes command 
decisions favoring the avoidance of one error type over the other. The sniper mission in 
Afghanistan examined in this case study will show that the error-avoidance theory 
demonstrates its ability for implementation in all situations and environments. 
In Afghanistan, the mountainous terrain provides for torturous travel conditions 
but can also provide some optimal elevated observation hide-sites for long-gun operators 
to do their best work. Throughout the Afghanistan conflict, military units would 
consistently engage the local populace in meetings commonly referred to as key leader 
engagements (KLE). The unit leaders would discuss various topics with the village elders 
or village leaders in efforts to accomplish objectives such as identifying the security 
threat, building rapport, gaining intelligence, and developing a situational picture in order 
to make better decisions and assessments within the assigned area. The KLE’s provided 
valuable information but not without cost. As improvised explosive devices diffused from 
Iraq and became a common threat in the Afghanistan war these missions became all the 
more dangerous and important. The visits to the KLE most often required a convoy along 
some dry secluded river beds and along steep mountain sides where every turn was taken 
cautiously.  
In this case study, I will examine one particular real-world KLE mission. This 
KLE mission was, in many ways, no different than any other. The intent of the KLE was 
to engage with the village elder on various topics; at the top of the list, the reoccurring 
IED strikes within his village on coalition forces. The unit had intelligence that kept 
tracing the IED material and facilitators back to this village and the last visits had been 
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met with opposition and a less-than-welcoming reception. Therefore, an observation 
position consisting of a sniper team had been placed the night prior to the meet. The 
village was located in a deep valley with only one main road in and out, numerous trails 
scattered throughout the village and surrounding mountains but only one road that was 
vehicle accessible. The unit’s previous visits had been met with sporadic small arms fires 
but, due to the terrain, identifying the origin of the shots was close to impossible. The 
village elder consistently denied responsibility of knowledge of those actions and assured 
the unit leadership that it was not members of his village. However, intelligence 
connected the IED and small arms fire back to the village. The sniper team was tasked 
with surveillance of the meeting site and the observable path into and out of the village. 
The following morning, the command team convoyed to the village, and met with 
the village elder to address the pressing security matters. Following the meeting, the unit 
leaders and village elders moved on foot to a shaded area for a final glass of chai before 
departure. At this point, the local partnered Afghan force working with the unit 
intercepted radio traffic indicating that an IED ambush was in place targeting the 
partnered convoy scheduled to leave the village within the next few minutes. The 
information was relayed to the sniper team, which focused its attention on activity within 
the village. The unit leadership, aware of the situation, carried on as normal and loaded to 
depart and moved down the road carefully and slowly until just out of sight and sound of 
the village. Once the convoy was around the bend in the road, an individual back at the 
village moved to the roof of one of the huts and proceeded to relay detailed information 
to the ambush team, which had placed a series of six IEDs along a quarter-mile stretch of 
the single road approximately three miles south. Unknown to the enemy spotter, every 
incriminating word spoken over the rudimentary radio was immediately translated and 
relayed to all vehicles and the sniper team. The sniper team wasted no time dialing in on 
the rooftop target  with the radio at his ear. At approximately 700 meters, the shot echoed 
through valley several times over and instantly struck its target’s center mass of the chest 
cavity. The impressive impact knocked the target backward off the hut and down to the 
entryway several meters below. The precise shot had instantly killed the individual. The 
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convoys crept forward, cleared and removed the IED threats, but were not able to engage 
those who emplaced them. 
With this example of an effective sniper operation, we find that the military unit 
involved decided to prioritize avoiding the Type 2 error, letting the target escape and the 
threat continue unthwarted, over the avoidance of committing a Type 1 error. Whether 
the military unit actively or inactively considered the variables the error-avoidance theory 
emphasizes, they ultimately decided that as the target presented itself it was best to 
neutralize the threat to avoid additional attacks and further threat. Although the civilian 
and military sniper operations are often deployed under diverse settings, the variables 
discussed present a helpful way to prioritize key choices and make decisions that align 
with the situation and are coherent across all setting. This case from Afghanistan 
demonstrates this effectively, as will be shown. 
A. ENVIRONMENT 
Although Afghanistan presents one of the more complex environments that the 
United States military and law enforcement units have operated in, this case is a prime 
example of a sniper operation that prioritized avoiding a Type 2 error. As the situation 
played out, it allowed for an extremely “clean” operation in which both errors were able 
to be avoided. In this section of Afghanistan, the rugged mountains and deep valley 
produce narrow corridors that restrict travel both by vehicle and on foot, to minimal 
paths. These avenues had always weighed heavily on those with a military mindset 
operating in a hostile country where the enemy attacked and vanished before ever 
identifying their location. These restrictive corridors have provided excellent locations 
for the opponent to inflict damage on U.S. or coalition partners despite their superior fire 
power. The harsh environment in this situation pushed the military leaders and unit 
members to proceed with extreme caution and set up the sniper teams as an extra 





an accurate assessment of the relational and cultural environment drove the military 
members to plan and factor in dangerous contingencies, which in turn assisted the snipers 
with a successful operation. 
As a result, the environment variable pushes this situation toward avoidance of a 
Type 2 error and therefore all the factors that go into a long-gun operation are tailored 
toward putting emphasis on not letting the target escape. Of course, a Type 1 error was 
also a relevant factor in the operation but not one that overpowered the risk of letting the 
explosive devices detonate. As the situation presented itself, the lone target on the hut 
roof minimized the risk of shooting an unintended individual. In summary, the 
environmental constraints produced a high risk of a Type 2 error. The Type 1 error was 
still factored into the operation but did not have the detrimental impact that was 
associated with letting the individual on the roof facilitate the attack on U.S. troops. 
B. SOCIAL / POLITICAL BLOWBACK 
The political and social impact of killing this individual in reality was minimal. 
Taking a human life in any and every situation is, of course, a difficult and complex 
occurrence that is never taken lightly. However, in reality, in conflicts and wars such as 
this there is an understanding and, at some levels, an acceptance of the loss of life. This, 
as true as it is, does not take away from the magnitude of a sniper taking a life. In this 
case, the impact of the operation was at many levels contained to the individuals who 
lived within this village and the members of the military unit conducting the operation. 
Thus, the social and political aspects did not extend much past those barriers because 
within the remote parts of Afghanistan a tribal culture is very much alive. Therefore, the 
impact on one tribe does not necessarily affect the neighboring tribe or village. As 
opposed from the other cases such as the massacre in California and the Ruby Ridge case 
where media played a significant role in the dispersal of the happenings, this situation 





learned by word of mouth, there was no significant repercussion from the sniper 
operation. All of these dynamics weighs heavily in favor of a strong preference for 
avoiding a Type 2 error, as the impact of a Type 1 error would be minimal while potential 
harm resulting from a Type 2 error would be significant. Again, the social and political 
blowback from targeting and killing a known facilitator of enemy operations that directly 
targeted U.S. and coalitions forces pushes allows the operations leadership to put a 
greater emphasis on a Type 2 error, which in this case, proved to potentially save the 
lives of many. 
C. STAKES 
As stated and evidenced, the emphasis of a Type 2 error in this military operation 
proved to be extremely valuable and prevented potential causalities both at the present 
time and for the future. The risk of not interdicting this target, which was coordinating a 
devastating attack on friendly forces, would have been taking an unnecessary chance and 
would have significantly increased the risk of harm to friendly forces. Two viewpoints on 
the stakes variable formed from this sniper situation and both pointed to a preference for 
Type 2 error avoidance. On one side of the discussion, the hazards of not neutralizing this 
individual were high and on the other, his death and the impact it would have on the 
situation as a whole would not be seen as a substantial factor, thus the decision to engage 
was the clear choice. Displayed in Figure 5, this case study shows how the variable 
assessment and accurate avoidance measures push the employing sniper operations to the 
center of the chart, which is furthest away from both errors and the best end state 
possible. In this case, given that all three relevant factors push the same direction on our 
scale, with varying strengths, the error-avoidance theory concludes that sniper operations 




Figure 5.  KLE Sniper Engagement 
So in Figure 5, each factor presses the theory toward either Type 1 or Type 2 
avoidance. The environmental, social and political blowback, and stakes variable in this 
military case study, as can be seen, presses in favor of eluding a Type 2 error. The social 
and political blowback in this case was minimal and bore no substantial push toward a 
Type 1 error. Thus, this variable did not have a strong impact on the decision process. 
Unlike the previous case studies, these variables yielded the clearest decision annotated 
by the minimal conflictions of the arrows on either side of the variable. Combined 
together, these three variables produced the conclusion of avoiding a Type 2 error, in this 
case, allowing the individual to escape. The error-avoidance theory allows the long-gun 







as the rules of engagement, in order to execute a successful mission. The rules of 
engagement for this case were important because it gave clear guidance to the concealed 
sniper on what actions he could engage with deadly force. The dominate factor, as shown 
in Figure 5, is the stakes variable and the potential risks posed if the target had not been 
neutralized. Therefore, in the end, the variables combined, showed a strong preference 
toward avoiding a Type 2 error. Again, the goal of any sniper operation is to avoid both 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
A. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, this error-avoidance theory can be a useful and functional tool for 
producing successful sniper operations. As shown in the case studies, the variables lead 
toward a path that if evaluated, will assist in reducing the amount of errors in these high 
stress conditions. However, in any critical, high pressure situation, decisions are often 
made with little or no time to truly evaluate what is occurring. 
This theory presents three critical variables to assess because they have the 
greatest impact on the outcome. The environmental, political and social blowback and the 
stakes or risks involved, when explored provide a channel to understanding how to 
approach the goal of resolution. The error-avoidance theory provides significant 
assistants in developing, planning, and executing long-gun operations. It also delivers 
specific assistance in outlining reasonable rules of engagement and dependable standard 
operating procedures which verifies it relevancy in the sniper arena. In order for sniper 
missions to maximize potential for success, they need very specific guidance that allows 
the operator to engage targets under different conditions. The very essence of a sniper 
mission includes neutralizing enemy targets that are not a direct threat to the operatives 
behind the gun, but have in the past, or will be in the near future, a legitimate hazard. 
This theory will assist with the entire sniper operation. In the past there has not been a 
one-size-fits-all solution to situations that require a sniper skill set and the unfortunate 
realism of the incident is that in many cases the event ends in loss of life. Therefore, as 
military and civilian long-gun operators face the grueling task to make decisions that deal 
with the ultimate question, it was my intent to provide a relevant, unified, way to cut 
straight to the heart of the matter, by avoiding errors that result in failure. 
The ultimate goal was to create a clear and consistent way to think about sniper 
operations across all domains. What the error-avoidance theory does is helps 
commanders and decision makers figure out how to execute these sniper operations all 
while avoiding critical errors. However, following the basic laws of physics, just as one 
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action causes a reaction, when you work toward avoiding one type error, the more 
vulnerable you become to the other type error. As in the error-avoidance theory, when a 
military or civilian sniper unit places an emphasis on not letting the target escape, a Type 
2 error, they logically create a path that could lead toward shooting the wrong person, a 
Type 1 error, and vice versa. Just the realization of this fact is a step in the right direction 
and can help build that bridge between failure and success in addition to facilitate that 
crucial movement toward the ultimate goal of avoidance of all errors. 
B. RECOMMENDATION 
The recommendation is quite simple, adaptation of the error-avoidance theory 
universally across those agencies and units that require a need for a sniper capability. As 
shown by history, a sniper’s skill set is one of increasing importance. As presented in the 
case studies, the error-avoidance theory can be applied against military, civilian, or any 
other long-gun operations. Looking through the lens of the error-avoidance theory, the 
reality is that these situations, military or civilian are not as different as some would 
suggest. The environment, social and political blowback, and the stakes or risks, all in 
some way, lean toward indications of Type 1 or Type 2 error. The difference lies within 
how each unit decides to handle the circumstances, therefore, highlighting the usefulness 
of a universal sniper theory. 
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